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A continuous-time distributed generalized Nash equilibrium seeking
algorithm over networks for double-integrator agents
Mattia Bianchi and Sergio Grammatico
Abstract— We consider a system of single- or double-
integrator agents playing a generalized Nash game over a
network, in a partial-information scenario. We address the
generalized Nash equilibrium seeking problem by designing
a fully-distributed dynamic controller, based on continuous-
time consensus and primal-dual gradient dynamics. Our main
technical contribution is to show convergence of the closed-loop
system to a variational equilibrium, under strong monotonicity
and Lipschitz continuity of the game mapping, by leveraging
monotonicity properties and stability theory for projected
dynamical systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) problems arise in
several network systems, where multiple selfish decision-
makers, or agents, aim at optimizing their individual, yet
inter-dependent, objective functions, subject to shared con-
straints. Engineering applications include demand-side man-
agement in the smart grid [1], charging/discharging of
electric vehicles [2], formation control [3], communication
networks [4]. From a game-theoretic perspective, the aim
is to design distributed GNE seeking algorithms, using the
local information available to each agent. Moreover, in the
cyber-physical systems framework, games are often played
by agents with their own dynamics [5], [6], and controllers
have to be conceived to steer the physical process to a
Nash equilibrium, while ensuring closed-loop stability. This
stimulates the development of continuous-time schemes [7],
[8], for which control-theoretic properties are more easily
unraveled.
Literature review: A variety of different methods have
been proposed to seek GNE in a distributed way [9], [10],
[11]. These works refers to a full-information setting, where
each agent can access the decision of all other agents, for
example if a coordinator broadcasts the data to the network.
Nevertheless, there are applications where the existence of
a central node must be excluded and each agent only relies
on the information exchanged over a network, via peer-to-
peer communication. To deal with this partial-information
scenario, payoff-based algorithms for Nash equilibrium (NE)
seeking have been studied, [12], [6]. In this paper, we are
instead interested in a different, model-based, approach. We
assume that the agents agree on sharing their strategies
with their neighbors; each agent keeps an estimate of other
agents’ action and asymptotically reconstructs the true value,
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exploiting the information exchanged over the network. This
solution has been examined extensively for games without
coupling constrains, both in discrete time [13], [14], and
continuous-time [7], [15], [16]. However, fewer works deal
with generalized games. Remarkably, Pavel in [17] derived
a single-timescale, fixed step sizes GNE learning algorithm,
by leveraging an elegant operator splitting approach. The au-
thors in [18] proposed a continuous-time design for aggrega-
tive games with equality constraints. All the results men-
tioned above consider single-integrator agents only. Distribu-
tively driving a network of more complex physical systems
to game theoretic solutions is still a relatively unexplored
problem. With regard to aggregative games, a proportional
integral feedback algorithm was developed in [5] to seek a
NE in networks of passive nonlinear second-order systems.
In [19], [20], continuous-time gradient-based controllers
were introduced, for some classes of nonlinear systems
with uncertainties. The authors of [6] considered generally
coupled costs games played by linear time-invariant agents,
via a discrete-time extremum seeking approach. NE problems
arising in systems of multi-integrator agents, in the presence
of deterministic disturbances, were addressed in [21]. In all
the references cited, the assumption is made of unconstrained
action sets and absence of coupling constraints.
Contribution: Motivated by the above, in this paper we
investigate continuous-time GNE seeking for networks of
single- or double-integrator agents. We consider games with
affine coupling constraints, played under partial-decision
information. Specifically:
• We introduce a primal-dual projected-gradient controller
for single-integrator agents, which is a continuous-time
version of the one proposed in [17]. We show convergence
of both primal and dual variables, under strong mono-
tonicity and Lipschitz continuity of the game mapping,
We are not aware of other continuous-time GNE seeking
algorithms for games with generally coupled costs, whose
convergence is guaranteed under such mild assumptions.
With respect to the setup (for aggregative game only) in
[18], we can also handle inequality constraints.
• We show how our controller can be adapted to learning
GNE in games with shared constraints, played by double-
integrator agents. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first equilibrium-seeking algorithm for generalized games
where the agents have second-order dynamics.
Basic notation: R (R≥0) denotes the set of (nonnega-
tive) real numbers. 0 (1) denotes a matrix/vector with all
elements equal to 0 (1
the dimension of these matrices/vectors as subscript. In ∈
R
n×n denotes the identity matrix of dimension n. For a
matrix A ∈ Rn×m, its transpose is A⊤, [A]i,j represents
the element on the row i and column j. A ⊗ B denotes
the Kronecker product of the matrices A and B. A ≻ 0
stands for symmetric positive definite matrix. For x, y ∈ Rn,
let x⊤y and ‖x‖ denote the Euclidean inner product and
norm respectively. If A is symmetric, λmin(A) := λ1(A) ≤
· · · ≤ λn(A) =: λmax(A) denote its eigenvalues. Given N
vectors x1, . . . , xN , possibly of different dimensions, x :=
col (x1, . . . , xN ) = [x
⊤
1 . . . x
⊤
N ]
⊤, and for each i = 1, . . . , N ,
x−i := col (x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xN ). Given the sets
{Si}i∈I , I = {1, . . . , N} we define S := ×i∈ISi :=
S1×· · ·×SN . diag(A1, . . . , AN ) denotes the block diagonal
matrix with A1, . . . , AN on its diagonal. For a differentiable
function g : Rn → R, ∇xg(x) denotes its gradient.
Operator-theoretic definitions: Given a set S ⊆ Rn, let S¯
denote the closure of S. The mapping projS : R
n → S
denotes the projection onto a closed convex set S, i.e.,
projS(v) := argminy∈S ‖y − v‖. A set-valued mapping
F : Rn ⇒ Rn is (µ-strongly) monotone if (u − v)⊤(x −
y) ≥ 0 (≥ µ‖x − y‖2) for all x 6= y ∈ Rn, u ∈ F(x),
v ∈ F(y). The set-valued mapping NS : Rn ⇒ Rn denotes
the normal cone operator for the the set S ⊆ Rn, i.e.,
NS(x) = ∅ if x /∈ S,
{
v ∈ Rn | supz∈S v
⊤(z − x) ≤ 0
}
otherwise. The tangent cone of S at a point x ∈ S is defined
as TS(x) =
⋃
δ>0
1
δ
(S − x). ΠS(x, v) := projTS(x)(v)
denotes the projection on the tangent cone of S at x of a
vector v ∈ Rn. By Moreau’s Decomposition Theorem [22,
Th. 6.30], it holds that v = projTS(x)(v)+projNS(x)(v) and
projTS(x)(v)
⊤projNS(x)(v) = 0.
Lemma 1: For any closed convex set S ⊆ Rq , any y, y′ ∈
S and any ξ ∈ Rq , it holds that
(y − y′)⊤ΠS (y, ξ) ≤ (y − y′)⊤ξ.
Thus, if ΠS(y, ξ) = 0, then (y − y′)⊤ξ ≥ 0. 
Proof: By Moreau’s theorem, (ξ −ΠC(y, ξ)) ∈ NS(y),
hence for any y, y′ ∈ C, (y′ − y)⊤(ξ −ΠC(y, ξ)) ≤ 0.
II. MATHEMATICAL SETUP
We consider a set of noncooperative agents, I :=
{1, . . . , N}, where each agent i ∈ I shall choose its
decision variable (i.e., strategy) xi from its local decision
set Ωi ⊆ Rni . Let x = col((xi)i∈I) ∈ Ω denote the stacked
vector of all the agents’ decisions, Ω = ×i∈IΩi ⊆ Rn
the overall action space and n :=
∑N
i=1 ni. Moreover, let
x−i = col((xj)j∈I\{i}) denote the collective strategy of the
all the agents, except that of agent i. The goal of each agent
i ∈ I is to minimize its objective function Ji(xi, x−i) which
depends on both the local variable xi and on the decision
variables of the other agents x−i.
Furthermore, we consider generalized games, where the
coupling among the agents arises also via their feasible
decision sets. In particular, we consider affine coupling
constraints; thus the overall feasible set is
X := Ω ∩ {x ∈ Rn | Ax ≤ b} , (1)
where A := [A1, . . . , AN ] and b :=
∑N
i=1 bi, with Ai ∈
R
m×ni and bi ∈ Rm being local data. The game then is
represented by the inter-dependent optimization problems:
∀i ∈ I :


argmin
yi∈Rni
Ji(yi, x−i)
s.t. (yi, x−i) ∈ X .
(2)
In this paper, we consider the problem to compute a GNE,
as formalized next.
Definition 1: A collective strategy x∗ = col ((x∗i )i∈N ) is
a generalized Nash equilibrium if, for all i ∈ I,
x∗i ∈ argmin
yi
Ji
(
yi, x
∗
−i
)
s.t. (yi, x
∗
−i) ∈ X .

Next, we postulate standard convexity and regularity as-
sumptions for the constraint sets and cost functions.
Standing Assumption 1 (Regularity and convexity): For
each i ∈ I, the set Ωi is non-empty, closed and convex; X
is non-empty and satisfies Slater’s constraint qualification;
Ji is continuously differentiable and the function Ji (·, x−i)
is convex for every x−i. 
Among all the possible GNE, we focus on the impor-
tant subclass of variational GNE (v-GNE) [23, Def. 3.11].
Namely, x∗ is a v-GNE of the game in (2) if and only if
there exist a dual variable λ∗ ∈ Rm such that the following
KKT conditions are satisfied [23, Th. 4.8]:
0n ∈ F (x∗) +A⊤λ∗ +NΩ (x∗)
0m ∈ − (Ax∗ − b) + NmR≥0 (λ
∗), (3)
where F is the pseudo-gradient mapping of the game:
F (x) := col ((∇xiJi(xi, x−i))i∈I) . (4)
A sufficient condition for the existence of a unique v-GNE
for the game in (2) is the strong monotonicity of the pseudo-
gradient [24, Th. 2.3.3], as postulated next. This assumption
was used, e.g., in [7, Ass. 2], [11, Ass. 3], [16, Ass. 4].
Standing Assumption 2: The pseudo-gradient mapping in
(4) is strongly monotone and Lipschitz continuous: for any
pair x, y ∈ Rn, (x − y)⊤(F (x) − F (y)) ≥ µ‖x − y‖2 and
‖F (x)− F (y)‖ ≤ θ0‖x− y‖, for some µ > 0, θ0 > 0. 
III. DISTRIBUTED GENERALIZED NASH EQUILIBRIUM
SEEKING
In this section, we consider the game in (2), where each
agent is associated with a dynamical system:
∀i ∈ I : x˙i = ΠΩi (xi, ui) , xi(0) ∈ Ωi. (5)
Our aim is to design the inputs ui to seek a v-GNE in a
fully distributed way. Specifically, agent i does not have
full knowledge of x−i, and only relies on the information
exchanged locally with neighbors over a communication
network G(I, E), with weighted symmetric Laplacian L ∈
R
N×N . The unordered pair (i, j) belongs to the set of edges,
E , if and only if agent j and i can exchange information.
Standing Assumption 3: The communication graph
G(I, E) is undirected and connected. 
Algorithm 1 Distributed GNE seeking
x˙i =ΠΩi (xi, ui)
ui =−
(
∇xiJi(xi,x
i
−i) +A
⊤
i λi + c
∑
j∈Ni wij(xi − x
j
i )
)
x˙i−i =− c
∑
j∈Ni wij(x
i
−i − x
j
−i)
z˙i =
∑
j∈Ni wij(λi − λj)
λ˙i =ΠRm
≥0
(
λi,
(
Aixi − bi −
∑
j∈Ni wij (zi − zj)
−
∑
j∈Ni wij(λi − λj)
))
The algorithm we propose is a continuous-time version of
[17, Alg. 1]. To cope with partial-decision information, each
agent keeps an estimate of all other agents’ action. We denote
xi = col((xij)j∈I) ∈ R
Nn, where xii := xi and x
i
j is i’s
estimate of agent j’s action, for all j 6= i. Moreover, each
agent keeps also an estimate λi ∈ Rm≥0 of the Lagrangian
multiplier and an auxiliary variable zi ∈ R
m to allow for
distributed consensus of the multiplier estimates.
Our proposed closed-loop dynamics are shown in Al-
gorithm 1, where c > 0 is a global constant parameter,
W = [wij ] ∈ RN×N is the weighted adjacency matrix
of the graph G, Ni is the set of neighbors of agent i and
xi−i(0) ∈ R
n−ni , λi(0) ∈ Rm≥0, zi(0) ∈ R
m can be chosen
arbitrarily.
We note that agents exchange {xi, zi, λi} with their
neighbors only, therefore the controller can be implemented
distributedly. In steady state, agents should agree on their
estimates, i.e., xi = xj , λi = λj , for all i, j ∈ I. This
motivates the presence of consensual terms for both the
primal and dual variables. We denote Eq := {y ∈ RNq :
y = 1N ⊗ y, y ∈ Rq} the consensual subspace of dimension
q, for some q > 0, and E⊥q its orthogonal complement.
Specifically, En is the estimate consensus subspace and Em
is the multiplier consensus subspace.
To write the system (5) under Algorithm 1 in compact
form, let us define, as in [17, Eq. 13-14], for all i ∈ I,
Ri :=
[
0ni×n<i Ini 0ni×n>i
]
, (6a)
Si :=
[
In<i 0n<i×ni 0n<i×n>i
0n>i×n<i 0n>i×ni In>i
]
, (6b)
where n<i =
∑
j<i,j∈I nj , n>i =
∑
j>i,j∈I nj . We note
thatRi selects the i-th ni dimensional component from an n-
dimensional vector, while Si removes it. Thus, Rixi = xii =
xi and Sixi = xi−i. We define R := diag ((Ri)i∈N ), S :=
diag ((Si)i∈N ). It follows that x = Rx, col((xi−i)i∈I) =
Sx ∈ R(N−1)n, and x = R⊤x + S⊤x. Let λ :=
col((λi)i∈I), Λ := diag (((Ai)i∈I)), b := col ((bi)i∈I),
Lx := L ⊗ In, Lλ := L ⊗ Im, z := col ((zi)i∈I). Fur-
thermore, we define the extended pseudo-gradient mapping
F as:
F (x) := col
(
(∇xiJi
(
xi,x
i
−i
)
)i∈I
)
. (7)
The overall closed-loop system, in compact form, reads as:
x˙ =R⊤ΠΩ
(
Rx,−
(
F (x) +Λ⊤λ+ cRLxx
))
+
S⊤ (−cSLxx) (8a)
z˙ =Lλλ (8b)
λ˙ =ΠRNm
≥0
(λ, (ΛRx− b −Lλλ−Lλz)). (8c)
The following Lemma relates the equilibria of the system
in (8) to the v-GNE of the game in (2). The proof is
analogous to [17, Th. 1], hence it is omitted.
Lemma 2: The following statements hold:
i) Any equilibrium point ω¯ = col
(
x¯, z¯, λ¯
)
of the dynam-
ics in (8) is such that x¯ = 1N ⊗ x
∗, λ¯ = 1N ⊗ λ∗,
where the pair (x∗, λ∗) satisfies the KKT conditions in
(3), hence x∗ is a v-GNE.
ii) The set of equilibrium points of (8) is nonempty. 
Remark 1: When considering Algorithm 1 in absence of
coupling constraints, we retrieve the controller in [7, Eq. 47].
We remark that, in Algorithm 1, each agent evaluates the
gradient of its cost function in its local estimate, not on the
actual collective strategy. In fact, only when the estimates
belong to the consensus subspace, i.e., x = 1 ⊗ x (in the
case of full-information, for example), we have that F (x) =
F (x). It follows that the operator R⊤F is not necessarily
monotone, not even if the pseudo gradient F in (4) is strongly
monotone, i.e., Standing Assumption 2. 
While cocoercivity of the extended pseudo-gradient (on
the augmented estimate space) is sometimes postulated in NE
problems under partial-information [13], [15], we will make
use of a weaker condition, namely Lipschitz continuity.
Lemma 3: The extended pseudo-gradient mapping F in
(7) is Lipschitz continuous: for any pair x,y ∈ RNn,
‖F (x)− F (y)‖ ≤ θ‖x− y‖, for some µ ≤ θ ≤ θ0. 
Proof: See Appendix VI-A.
Under Lipschitz continuity of the extended pseudo-
gradient, [17] showed the following result, which is crucial
to prove convergence of the dynamics in (8).
Lemma 4 ([17, Lem. 3]): Let
M :=
[
µ
N
− θ0+θ
2
√
N
− θ0+θ
2
√
N
cλ2(L)− θ
]
, c := (θ0+θ)
2+4µθ
4µλ2(L)
. (9)
For any c > c, for any x and any x′ ∈ En, it holds that
M≻ 0 and that
(x− x′)⊤
(
R⊤ (F (x)− F (x′)) + cLx (x− x′)
)
≥ λmin(M) ‖x− x
′‖2 . 
Leveraging the restricted strong monotonicity property
stated in the previous Lemma, we show the main result of
this section, i.e., the convergence of dynamics in (8) to a
v-GNE.
Theorem 1: Let c > c, with c as in (9), and let Ω :=
{x ∈ RNn | Rx ∈ Ω}. For any initial condition in Ξ = Ω×
R
mN×RmN≥0 , the dynamics in (8) have a unique Carathodory
solution, which belongs to Ξ for all t ≥ 0. The solution
converges to an equilibrium col
(
x¯, z¯, λ¯
)
, with x¯ = 1N⊗x∗,
λ¯ = 1N ⊗ λ
∗, where the pair (x∗, λ∗) satisfies the KKT
conditions in (3), hence x∗ is a v-GNE for the game in (2).

Proof: See Appendix VI-B.
IV. DISTRIBUTED GENERALIZED NASH EQUILIBRIUM
SEEKING FOR DOUBLE-INTEGRATOR AGENTS
In this section, we consider a game as in (2) under the
following additional assumption [21, Ass. 1].
Assumption 1: Ω = Rn. 
Moreover, we model each agent as a double integrator:
∀i ∈ I :
{
x˙i =vi
v˙i =ui.
(10a)
(10b)
where xi, vi, ui ∈ Rni . We emphasize that in (10) we cannot
directly control the agent strategy xi. Our objective is to
drive each agent action (i.e., the xi coordinates of each agent
state (xi, vi)) to a v-GNE. Moreover, at steady state, the
velocities of all the agents must be zero. This scenario has
been considered recently in [21], for games without coupling
constraints.
In (10), we consider the controller ui =
1
hi
(u˜i−vi), where
u˜i has to be chosen appropriately; moreover, as in [21], let
us define the coordinates transformation
ζi := xi + hivi. (11)
Here hi > 0 are positive steps, for all i ∈ I. The quantity ζi
can be interpreted as a prediction of the position of agent i
given a forward step hi. The closed-loop system in the new
coordinates then reads as
∀i ∈ I :
{
v˙i =
1
hi
(u˜i − vi)
ζ˙i =u˜i.
(12a)
(12b)
We note that the dynamics of the variable ζi in (12b),
under Assumption 1, are identical to the single-integrator
in (5), with translated input u˜i. As such, we are are able
to design the input u˜i, according to Algorithm 1, to drive
ζ := col((ζi)i∈I) to an equilibrium ζ¯ = x∗, where x∗
is the v-GNE for the game in (2). Moreover, the velocity
dynamics (12a) are Input-to-state-stable (ISS) with respect to
the input ui [25, Lemma 4.6]. Finally, we remark that, at any
equilibrium of (10), vi = 0ni , hence ζi = xi, for all i ∈ I.
Building on this considerations, we propose Algorithm 2 to
drive the double-integrator agents (10) towards a v-GNE.
Differently from Algorithm 1, the agents are not keeping
an estimate of other agents action, but of other agents
prediction. Here, ζi = col((ζij)j∈I), and ζ
i
j represents agent
i’s estimation of the quantity ζj = xj + hjvj for j 6= i ,
while ζii := xi + hivi = ζi. In compact form, the closed-
Algorithm 2 Distributed GNE seeking (double-integrators)
x˙i =vi
v˙i =ui
ui =−
1
hi
(
∇iJi(ζ
i
i, ζ
i
−i) +A⊤i λi
+ c
∑
j∈Ni wij(ζ
i
i − ζ
j
i )
)
− 1
hi
vi
ζ˙
i
−i =−
∑
j∈Ni wij(ζ
i
−i − ζ
j
−i), ζ
i
i = xi + hivi
z˙i =
∑
j∈Ni wij(λi − λj)
λ˙i =ΠRm
≥0
(
λi,
(
Aiζ
i
i − bi −
∑
j∈Ni wij(zi − zj)
−
∑
j∈Ni wij(λi − λj)
))
loop system reads as
x˙ =v (13a)
Hv˙ =− (F (ζ) +Λ⊤λ+ cRLxζ)− v (13b)
Sζ˙ =− cSLxζ, Rζ = x+Hv (13c)
z˙ =Lλλ (13d)
λ˙ =ΠRNm
≥0
(λ, (ΛRζ − b −Lλλ−Lλz)). (13e)
Theorem 2: Let Assumption 1 hold. For any initial condi-
tion with λ(0) ∈ RmN≥0 , the equations in (13) have a unique
Carathodory solution, such that λ(t) ∈ RNm≥0 , for all t ≥ 0.
The solution converges to an equilibrium col
(
x¯, v¯, ζ¯, z¯, λ¯
)
,
with x¯ = x∗, v¯ = 0n, ζ¯ = 1N ⊗ x∗, λ¯ = 1N ⊗ λ∗, where
the pair (x∗, λ∗) satisfies the KKT conditions in (3), so x∗
is a v-GNE for the game in (2). 
Proof: See Appendix VI-C.
We note that Algorithm 2 is derived by choosing u˜i in
(12) according to Algorithm 1. The proof of Theorem 2 is
not based on the specific structure of Algorithm 1, but only
on its convergence properties. Hence the result still holds if
another controller with similar features is selected in place
of Algorithm 1. In [21], the authors addressed NE problems
and chose the inputs u˜i according to the algorithm presented
in [7, Eq. 47]. The controller in [7] achieves exponential
convergence to a NE, hence ISS with respect to possible
additive disturbances [25, Lemma 4.6]. Therefore, in [21],
the authors were able to tackle the presence of deterministic
disturbances, via an asymptotic observer and by leveraging
ISS arguments. We have not guaranteed this robustness, i.e.,
exponential convergence, for the primal-dual dynamics in
(8). However, the controller in [21] is designed for games
without any constraints (local or shared). On the contrary,
the controller in Algorithm 2 drives the system in (10) to a
v-GNE of a generalized game, and ensures for the coupling
constraints to be satisfied asymptotically. We also remark
that, like in [21], we assumed the absence of constraints
on the local feasible set of each agent (Assumption 1).
Nevertheless, if some are present, they can be included in
the coupling constraints.
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Fig. 1. Results of Alg. 1 for single- and double-integrator agents.
V. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE: MOBILE SENSOR NETWORK
We consider a group of five robots moving in a plane as
in [21]. Each agent i ∈ I = {1, . . . , 5} has a cost function
Ji (pi, p−i) := p⊤i pi + p
⊤
i ri +
∑
j∈I ‖pi − pj‖
2
with pi = col(xi, yi) its cartesian coordinates, r1 =
col(2,−2), r2 = col(−2,−2), r3 = col(−4, 2), r4 =
col(2,−4), r5 = col(3, 3). The robots can communicate over
a randomly generated connected graph G(I, E).
We assume the local constraints 0.1 ≤ yi ≤ 0.5, ∀i ∈ I. In
order for all the robots to maintain communication with their
neighbors, we impose the Chebyschev distance between any
two neighboring robots to be smaller than 0.2m. Hence the
(affine) coupling constraints are represented by max{|xi −
xj |, |yi − yj |} ≤ 0.2, ∀(i, j) ∈ E .
Velocity-actuated robots: each agent is modeled as in (5)
and we apply Algorithm 1.
Force-actuated robots : Each agent has a dynamic as in
(10), under Algorithm 2. The local constraints are considered
as part of the coupling constraints, hence are dualized and
will be satisfied asymptotically (see Section IV).
The initial conditions are chosen randomly and we fix c =
30 to satisfy the condition in Theorem 1. Figure 1 illustrates
the results for the two cases and shows convergence the
GNE of the game and asymptotic satisfaction of the coupling
constraints. Finally, in Figure 2, we compare the trajectories
of the five robots in the velocity-actuated and force-actuated
scenario. In the two cases, the agents are converging to
the same, unique v-GNE. However, the local constraints
are satisfied along the whole trajectory for single integrator
agents, only asymptotically for the double integrator agents.
VI. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
Generalized games played by double-integrator agents
can be solved via a fully distributed primal-dual projected-
pseudogradient dynamic controller, if the game mapping is
strongly monotone and Lipschitz continuous. Seeking an
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Fig. 2. Velocity-actuated and force-actuated robots trajectories.
equilibrium in games with compact action sets or constrained
dynamics is currently an unexplored problem. The extension
of our results to networks of heterogeneous dynamical sys-
tems is left as future research.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 3
Let us define x = col((xi)i∈I), y = col((yi)i∈I). By
Standing Assumption 2, we have, for all i ∈ I,
‖∇iJi(x
i)−∇iJi(y
i)‖ ≤ θ0‖x
i − yi‖,
as it is clear by choosing xj = yj for all j 6= i. Therefore
it holds that
‖F (x)− F (y)‖2 =
∑
i∈I ‖∇iJi(x
i)−∇iJi(yi)‖2
≤ θ20
∑
i∈I ‖x
i − yi‖2
= θ20‖x− y‖
2.
Then θ ≥ µ follows by choosing Sx = Sy, x 6= y. 
B. Proof of Theorem 1
Under Standing Assumption 3, we have, for any q > 0,
Null (L⊗ Iq) = Range (1N ⊗ Iq) = Eq. (14)
We first rewrite the dynamics as
ω˙ = ΠΞ(ω,−B(ω)− Φω), (15)
where ω = col (x, z,λ),
Φ =
[
0 0 R⊤Λ⊤
0 0 −Lλ
−ΛR Lλ 0
]
, B(ω) =
[
R⊤F (x)+cLxx
0Nm
Lλλ+b
]
.
B is Lipschitz continuous by Standing Assumption 2 and Ξ is
closed and convex by Standing Assumption 1. We conclude
that that there exists a unique Carathodory solution to (15),
that belongs to Ξ for every t ≥ 0, [26, Th. 2.5]. Consider
the quadratic Lyapunov function
V (ω) = 12‖ω − ω¯‖
2,
where ω¯ := col(x¯, z¯, λ¯) is any equilibrium of (8). We
remark that, by Lemma 2, an equilibrium exists, and x¯ =
1N ⊗ x∗, λ¯ = 1N ⊗ λ∗, with (x∗, λ∗) satisfying the KKT
conditions in (3). We can apply Lemma 1 to obtain
V˙ (ω) :=∇V (ω)ω˙ = (ω − ω¯)⊤ω˙ =
=(ω − ω¯)⊤ΠΞ(ω,−B(ω)− Φω)
≤(ω − ω¯)⊤(−B(ω)− Φω). (16)
By Lemma 1, it also holds that (ω−ω¯)⊤(−B(ω¯)−Φω¯) ≤ 0.
By subtracting this term from (16), we obtain
V˙ (ω) ≤ −(ω − ω¯)⊤ (B(ω)− B(ω¯) + Φ(ω − ω¯))
=− (x− x¯)⊤R⊤ (F (x)− F (x¯))
− (x− x¯)⊤ (cLx) (x− x¯)
− (λ− λ¯)⊤Lλ(λ− λ¯),
(17)
where, in the last equality, we used that, Φ⊤ = −Φ. By (14)
and [22, Cor. 18.16], we have that (λ − λ¯)⊤Lλ(λ − λ¯) ≥
1
2λmax(L)
‖Lλλ‖2. Finally, by Lemma 4, we obtain
V˙ ≤ −λmin(M)‖x− x¯‖
2 − 12λmax(L)‖Lλλ‖
2 ≤ 0, (18)
with M ≻ 0 as in (9). By noticing that V is radially
unbounded, we conclude that the solution to (8) is bounded.
Besides, by [16, Th. 2], the solution converges to the largest
invariant set O contained in Z := {ω s.t. V˙ (ω) = 0}.
We first characterize any point col(xˆ, zˆ, λˆ) ∈ Z , for which
the quantities in (16)-(18) must be zero. By (18), xˆ = x¯ =
1N ⊗x∗, and λˆ ∈ Em, i.e. λˆ = 1N ⊗ λˆ, for some λˆ ∈ Rm≥0.
Also, by expanding (16), and by using that xˆ = x¯, Lλλˆ = 0,
we have
0 = (λˆ− λ¯)⊤(ΛRx¯− b−Lλzˆ) = (λˆ − λ∗)⊤(Ax∗ − b)
= λˆ⊤(Ax∗ − b) = λˆ
⊤
(ΛRx¯− b−Lλλˆ−Lλzˆ), (19)
where in the second equality we have used (14) and the
fourth equality follows from the KKT conditions in (3). This
concludes the characterization of the set Z .
By invariance, any trajectory ω(t) = col(x(t), z(t),λ(t))
starting at any col(x, z,λ) ∈ O must lie in Z ⊃ O for
all t ≥ 0. Therefore, x(t) ≡ x¯ and λ(t) ∈ Em for all t.
Moreover, z˙(t) = 0, for all t, by (8b), or z(t) ≡ z. Hence the
quantity v := (ΛRx(t)− b−Lλλ(t)−Lλz(t)) is constant
along the trajectory ω. Suppose by contradiction that vk > 0,
where vk denotes the k-th component of v. Then, by (8c),
λ˙(t)k = vk for all t, and λ(t) grows indefinitely. Since
all the solutions of (8) are bounded, this is a contradiction.
Therefore, v ≤ 0, and λ(t)⊤v = 0 by (19). Equivalently,
v ∈ NRNm
≥0
(λ(t)), hence λ˙(t) = 0, for all t. We conclude
that all the points in the set O are equilibria.
The set Λ(ω0) of ω-limit points
1of the solution to (8) start-
ing from any ω0 ∈ Ξ is nonempty (by Bolzano-Weierstrass
theorem, since all the trajectories of (8) are bounded) and
invariant (as in proof of [16, Lemma 5]). By V˙ ≤ 0 it follows
1z : [0,∞) → Rn has an ω-limit point at z¯ if there exists a nonnegative
diverging sequence {tk}k∈N such that z (tk) → z¯
that V must be constant on Λ(ω0), hence Λ(ω0) ⊆ Z (see
proof of [16, Th.2]). Also Λ(ω0) is invariant, so Λ(ω0) ⊆
O. Since the distance to any equilibrium point along any
trajectory of (8) is non-increasing by (18), it follows that if
a solution of (8) has an ω-limit point at an equilibrium, then
the solution converges to that equilibrium. The last claim
follows by Lemma 2. 
C. Proof of Theorem 2
By applying the coordinate transformation x 7→ Rζ =
x+Hv, we obtain:
v˙ =−H−1(F (ζ) +Λ⊤λ+ cRLxζ)−H−1v (20a)
ζ˙ =−R⊤(F (ζ) +Λ⊤λ+ cRLxζ)− cS⊤SLxζ (20b)
z˙ =Lλλ (20c)
λ˙ =ΠRNm
≥0
(λ, (ΛRζ − b −Lλλ −Lλz)). (20d)
The system (20) is in cascade form for (20a) with respect
to (20b)-(20d). Notice also that, under Assumption 1, the
subsystem (20b)-(20d) is exactly (8). Hence, there exists a
unique solution to (20b)-(20d), that is bounded and con-
verges to an equilibrium point col
(
ζ¯, k¯, z¯, λ¯
)
, with ζ¯ =
1N ⊗ x∗, λ¯ = 1N ⊗ λ∗, where the pair (x∗, λ∗) satisfies
the KKT conditions in (3), by Theorem 1. On the other
hand, the dynamic (20a) is ISS with respect to the input
u˜ := −H−1(F (ζ) + Λ⊤λ + cRLxζ) [25, Lemma 4.6],
and this input is bounded, by boundedness of the trajectory
(ζ,k, z,λ) and Lemma 3. Moreover, since ζ¯ = 1N ⊗ x∗,
λ¯ = 1N⊗λ
∗, by the KKT conditions in (3) and by continuity,
we have u˜ → 0n for t → ∞. Therefore, v(t) → 0n
for t → ∞ (this follows from definition of ISS, see [25,
Ex. 4.58]). By definition of ζi = Riζ
i in (11), we can also
conclude that x→ x∗. 
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